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Biological & Social Factors 
Entwined through History	

§ Scourge	

§ Eradication	

§ Resurgence	

§ Current vaccination  
campaign	
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Ancient & More Recent History	

§   Probably originated in Nile Valley 
>3000 years ago	

§   Killed Pharaoh Ramses V 1157 BCE	

§   Reached Europe 710 CE	

§   Conquistador Hernando Cortez 
brought to Central Mexico 1520	

§   Devastated Aztecs —estimated 3.5 
million died within 2 years	

§   Arrived New England early 17th cen	

§ 18th Century European Plague — 
Killed reigning monarchs in 5 states	
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Native Cultures	
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The Organism: Variola Pox Virus	

§ Large, brick-shaped, about 
size of small  bacteria. 	

§ Complex internal structure	

§ Surface covered with 
filamentous protein,  
so virus particles look like a 
ball of knitting wool	

§ Enclosed in an envelope 
derived from host cell 
membranes. 	
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 Disease Symptoms	

§  Incubation: 1-2+ weeks. No  
symptoms.  Not infective	

§  Pre-Eruption (days 1-3): flu-like symptoms	

§   Lesions, Papules, Pustules (days 4-10): 
increasingly infective via aerosol	

§  Scabbing, Crusting (days 11-14): somewhat  
                                     infective until all  
                                     scabs gone 	

Day 10	
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Disease Outcomes	

§ Patient dead or recovered w/in month	

§ Historically killed 3-4 million per year	

§   Children & elderly most susceptible  
(10% of those born, died)	

§ Mortality rate nearly 30%	

§ Most survivors scarred  
             (~ 75%), many blind  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Prevention  
& Inoculation	

§ Prior to “vaccine,” 
people were 
knowingly inoculated 
(variolated) to gain 
immunity	

§ People were also 
knowingly inoculated 
as means of germ 
warfare  
(bioterrorism) 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Isolation & Quarantine	

§  Isolation — segregation of  
the diseased	

§  Quarantine — preventative 
segregation of the exposed	

	
 • Requires trust	

• Fear & anger toward the sick	

• Counters urge to flee 	

• Messes with the mind	

• Interferes with livelihood	

• Wreaks havoc on social interaction	
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Smallpox  
Hospitals	

Smallpox Hospital Salem Willows, New England!
Smallpox Hospital Roosevelt Island, 1860!
  Does disease adhere 
to  bounds of class  
& privilege?	

	

Smallpox Hospital Roosevelt Island,1905!
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Vaccinia	
 § Dr. Edward Jenner discovered 
benefits of injecting people with 
Vaccinia virus (cowpox), 1796	

§ Vaccine from fluid scraped from 
sores on skin of infected calves	

§   Antibodies protect against 
smallpox as well as cowpox  
	

Vaccines rank among 
top ten public health 
achievements of 20th 
century (CDC) 	

Vaccination	
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Smallpox  
Vaccine	

§ Civil liberties	

§ Medical ethics	

James Phipps, 8-year-old  
son of Jenner’s gardner,  
was inoculated with  
cowpox, given 8 weeks  
to develop antibodies for 
resistance, & then  
exposed to smallpox.  
Success! — No infection!	
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§ Man infected in Mexico develops smallpox in NYC	

§ Massive free vaccination campaign reaches  
> 6 million in NYC within 2 weeks	

§ Outbreak controlled with minimal illness	

§ Neighboring counties charge NYC hoarded vaccine 
	

NYC 1947—public health & politics	
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Stress & Mental Health	

April 17,1947: NYC police charge woman with 
illegal medical practice for posing as nurse to 
vaccinate 500 persons with water	

April 18, 1947: woman is sent to Bellevue 
Hospital for observation  (NYTimes Archives).	
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Trade & Travel	

§ Moves with people along routes of immigration, 
trade, & pilgrimage	

§ Trans-oceanic travel created global scourge	

§   Long understood to be highly contagious, 
especially in close quarters	
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Smallpox Eradication	

§ How was it done?	

§ Why was it successful?	

	
 	
 	
 	
Trust    
	
 	
 	
Fear    
	
 	
 	
Coercion 	

	
 	
 	
 	
Incentives    	

	
 	
 	
 	
Political will     	

	
 	
 	
 	
Self Interest	

	
 	
 	
 	
Investment of resources	

	
 	
 	
 	
Highly motivated public health team 
	
 	
 	
Sense of responsibility to community 	

Donald Henderson!
William Foege!
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Mass Vaccination Strategy	
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Ring Vaccination Strategy  
Surveillance/Containment	
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Panic & Fear 	
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Community (Ir)Responsibility	

§ Ali Maow Maalim	

§ Last known natural case of 
smallpox, Somalia, 1977	

§   As 21-year-old health 
worker evaded vaccine due 
to FEAR	

§   Exposed to smallpox, 
became ill, went to natural 
healer who rubbed spit on 
his body	
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Coercion 	

§ Europe Jan 1972: smallpox-free	

§ Yugoslavia Feb 1972: smallpox  
re-introduced by cleric returning 
from pilgrimage to Mecca	

§ All transportation halted:  
entire nation quarantined	

§ Army vaccinated 18 million in 10 days	

Outbreak successfully aborted  
 Civil Liberties trampled	
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Weaponizing Smallpox	

§  Current attention to smallpox 
primarily because of threat of  
use in germ warfare	

§  Risk diﬃcult to assess  
because uncertainty is huge	
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BioTerrorism	

Harvard survey:	

§ US public does not  
trust any single  
spokesperson  
re: bioterrorism	

§ Nearly 3 in 10 African Americans believe  
there would be discrimination in  
treatment during an outbreak	

(Source: Harvard Public Health NOW. June 2002)	
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Vaccination Campaign	

Why were earlier vaccination campaigns seen as 
a “godsend” & this one thought to present 
unacceptable risk?	
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Mass Vaccination Strategy	
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Lack of Trust & More	

§  Public understands social impacts  
& personal risk of vaccine	

§  Public does not trust they  
will be “taken care of” 	

§   Population at greater health  
risk from vaccine than before:  
older, more are immuno-compromised	

§  Lack of trust in government vaccination strategy	

§  Comparative Risk:  Abstract risk of smallpox vs. 
 known risk of vaccine side-eﬀects	

§  Germ Warfare is diﬃcult & terrifying to contemplate	

§  Infectious disease doctors know how to treat smallpox.	

§  Vaccine eﬀective up to 4 days after exposure	
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“We have a system where people 
dealing with disasters don’t have a clue 
about what the public is thinking” 
 
	

(Source: Harvard Public  
Health NOW. June 2002.  
Quoting Dr. Robert Blendon, 
 Director Harvard Program  
on Public Opinion  
Health and Social Policy)	

